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stream Christian theology" (p. 205). In a word, even if, contrary to what I have 
urged, Hasker's arguments for incompatibilism were indeed compelling, it would 
still be incumbent upon Christian philosophers to preserve the classical under-
standing of divine providence, which is a linchpin of the Christian Faith and of 
the traditions of intellectual inquiry it has inspired. As I see it, this is the main 
theological lesson to be learned from Hasker's remarkably provocative book. 
NOTES 
1. See Luis de Molina, On Divine Foreknowledge (Part IV of the "Concordia .. ), 
translated, with an introduction and notes, by Alfred J. Freddoso (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 1988), pp. 75-78; Thomas P. Flint, "Hasker's God, Time, and Knowl-
edge," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 103-115; and Rod Bertolet, "Hasker on Middle 
Knowledge," Faith and Philosophy 10 (1993): 3-17. In fairness to Hasker, I should also 
mention his "Response to Thomas Flint," Philosophical Studies 60 (1990): 117-126, as 
well as the amicus brief filed by Robert Merrihew Adams in "An Anti-Molinist Argument," 
Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 343-353. 
2. For more on this, see my "God's General Concurrence with Secondary Causes: Why 
Conservation is not Enough," Philosophical Perspectives 5 (1991): 553-585. 
3. In "Divine Providence and Simple Foreknowledge," Faith and Philosophy, forth-
coming, David Hunt argues that if we reject the claim that God has complete providential 
sovereignty over all events, including free actions-a claim he stigmatizes as 'hyper-
Calvinist' but might just as well have called 'Augustinian' or 'Thomistic'-we may 
coherently maintain that simple foreknowledge can contribute to "the strongest providen-
tial control compatible with there being free agents other than God." Perhaps. But Hunt 
is mistaken in his undocumented assertion that he is defending the "traditional" position. 
4. See Flint, "In Defence of Theological Compatibilism," Faith alld Philosophy 8 
(1991): 237-243; and "Hasker's God, Tillie, and Knowledge," esp. pp. 112-14. For the 
record, the relevant power entailment principle is this: If p is true and entails q, then if it 
cannot be in anyone's power to bring it about that p is false, it cannot be in anyone's power 
to bring it about that q is false. So given that (i) God's past belief entails that Peter will 
refrain from watching the game and that (ii) Peter cannot make it the case that God never 
held that belief, Peter cannot make it false that he will refrain from watching the game. 
5. For more on this point, see Nelson Pike, "A Latter-Day Look at the Foreknowledge 
Problem," illtematiollal Journalfor Philosophy of Religion, forthcoming. 
Christian Philosophy, edited by Thomas P. Flint. Notre Dame, Indiana: 
University of Notre Dame Press, 1990. Pp. xix + 226. $31.95. 
WILLIAM HASKER, Huntington College. 
Christian Philosophy comprises seven papers delivered at a 1988 conference 
at Notre Dame, plus an excellent introduction by Thomas Flint. I shall com-
ment on each of the essays in turn. 
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Norman Kretzmann leads off with "Faith Seeks, Understanding Finds: 
Augustine's Charter for Christian Philosophy," a piece which analyzes 
Augustine's conception of the relationship between faith and understanding. 
Certain problems arise if we suppose, as might initially seem natural, that 
faith is "a deficient cognitive state to be supplanted by understanding" (p. 
10). If this is what faith is, how are we to understand Augustine's notion that 
understanding supplements rather than replaces faith? How can an imperfect, 
authority-based acceptance of a proposition coexist with a firm, rational grasp 
of its truth? The solution to these and other difficulties is found in the insight 
that faith for Augustine is not primarily "propositional faith" but rather the 
religious way of faith, which involves commitment to the way of life implied 
by Christian doctrine. Thus, "the aim of Christian philosophy as Augustine 
sees it is to combine propositional understanding with the way of faith" (p. 
18). Thus baldly stated, the conclusion is not particularly startling; what 
cannot be conveyed in a brief summary is the skill and loving care with which 
Kretzmann analyzes alternatives, elicits the intentions behind Augustine's 
text, and draws implications for Christian philosophy as it is practiced today. 
The doctrine of the atonement receives attention in "Justice, Mercy, Super-
erogation, and Atonement," by Richard Purtill. Purtill's central idea is that 
the Son of God, by his voluntary acceptance of suffering and death, performed 
a work of supererogation which made it appropriate that the Father, on his 
request, should pardon repentant sinners who are otherwise deserving of 
damnation. In developing this Purtill rejects "strict retributionism," which 
holds that one "should never punish more or less than is deserved," thus 
making mercy impossible. He also rejects "weak retributionism," which holds 
that mere repentance is always in itself a good and sufficient reason for 
pardon, thus making atonement unnecessary. But how are we to understand 
the reason behind Christ's suffering and death? Purtill concludes, "It seems 
that there is no real substitute for a theory of our incorporation into Christ 
which takes our unity with Christ as a genuine metaphysical fact" (p. 46). He 
does not go on to explicate the nature of this metaphysical fact; nevertheless, 
his suggestions hold real promise for further work on this doctrine. 
In "Providence and the Problem of Evil" Eleonore Stump places her own 
previously stated views on theodicy in the context of an account of divine 
providence derived from Aquinas. While this account of providence adds 
depth and background to the theodicy, the centerpiece of the latter remains 
Stump's claim that all undeserved suffering is a benefit (or at least, the best 
available means to a benefit) for the one who suffers. The first objection 
considered is, "This approach to the problem of evil apparently entails that 
nothing bad-nothing really bad, that is-ever happens to anybody. But this 
conclusion is wildly implausible." Stump admits the entailment, but replies, 
"This ... objection is equivalent to insisting that the problem of evil is insol-
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uble" (p. 69). Such a response, I think, amounts to a rather abrupt (not to say 
question-begging) dismissal of all those theodicies which do not affirm what 
her own theodicy affirms. In any case, there may be a difficulty about Stump's 
appropriation of Aquinas. Is she really entitled to help herself to his doctrine 
of providence, when her account of how God is able to operate to accomplish 
his providential purposes differs so fundamentally from his? She emphati-
cally rejects both theological determinism (arguably the best interpretation 
of Aquinas) and Molinism, and affirms what I have elsewhere called a "risk-
taking" view of providence. It would seem plausible that this might require 
some modifications in Aquinas's doctrine, though I am not certain that this 
is SO.1 
Alan Donagan's contribution is entitled, "Can Anybody in a Post-Christian 
Culture Rationally Believe the Nicene Creed?" The Nicene Creed functions 
here as a specific expression of the historic Christian faith; Donagan answers 
the question through a combination of apologetics with an account of his 
personal journey of faith. He begins with a discussion of the development of 
doctrine (considered as posing a threat to the claim that all of the church's 
teaching is apostolic), and follows with some remarks on demythologizing. 
He then turns to naturalism, and cites C. S. Lewis's well-known argument 
against naturalism (or materialism) from Miracles as an example of failed 
apologetics. (He subscribes to the popular view that Lewis's argument was 
demolished by Elizabeth Anscombe, and does not discuss the changes Lewis 
made in the revised edition of Miracles. 2 ) Should Christian philosophers, 
then, seek a replacement for Lewis's (supposedly failed) argument? Donagan 
thinks not; materialism, in his view, is really not worth refuting: "Understood 
as the doctrine that nothing happens that is not causally explicable in terms 
of the natural sciences as they now are, materialism is certainly false; 
and ... understood as the doctrine that nothing happens that is not causally 
explicable in terms of ideal natural science, it is something we know not 
what" (p. 107). Here I think Donagan is mistaken. It is true that contemporary 
materialism appeals to the future progress of science. But there are some 
fairly tight constraints on what this future science is to be like: it must not, 
for instance, contain any ultimate, irreducible, intentionality or teleology. 
Materialism so conceived is by no means a will-o' -the-wisp, and the task of 
refuting it is not necessarily a futile one. 
The final, and in some respects the most impressive, section of the paper 
deals mainly with the current state of biblical studies and their effect on those 
who inquire into the faith. He has some severe comments on the methods 
used by many biblical scholars, and remarks that "Accepting the Nicene faith 
has been, for all I have talked to, in large part a matter of forming a critical 
attitude to much biblical scholarship" (p. 113). In his conclusion (p. 116), 
Donagan asks: "Why do converts to Christianity from pre-Christian and post-
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Christian cultures accept [its doctrines]? ... When they learn what Christianity 
teaches, they judge it, if true, to be a remedy for their condition .... Their 
verdict is, like Peter's when Jesus asked him, 'Will you also go away?' 'Lord, 
to whom shall we go? thou hast the words of eternal life ... ' 
Next comes Nicholas Wolterstorff's essay, "The Remembrance of Things 
(Not) Past: Philosophical Reflections on Christian Liturgy." Wolterstorff sur-
veys a large range of materials relevant to the understanding of ritual, from 
Mircea Eliade to Brevard Childs to Max Thurian to Edward Casey to Sigmund 
Mowinckel. His central focus, however, is an interpretation of the human (not 
the divine) actions in the Eucharist. His interpretation cannot be summarized 
here; I will only say that it strikes me as surprisingly thin and unsatisfying. 
Perhaps Wolterstorff would agree that a great deal remains to be said; he 
concludes with an appeal to philosophers to pay attention to Christian ritual 
as they have to Christian belief, Christian ethical action, and Christian expe-
rience. The point is well made, but the task seems to call for an aesthetician, 
and we have few if any aestheticians of Wolterstorff's stature who might 
undertake it. So it is to be hoped that he will take up his own challenge and 
give us a book on the subject. 
"Love and Absolutes in Christian Ethics," by J. L. A. Garcia, deals with a 
number of related ethical topics. Garcia begins by setting out his own ethical 
theory, in which (1) "a person's moral life comprises certain salient relation-
ships or roles ... [and] to be morally good or bad is to be good or bad in such 
roles as friend, parent, offspring, spouse, neighbor (in the scriptural sense), 
confidante, informant, promiser, etc." (p. 163); and (2) it is love (interpreted 
as benevolence) which determines whether one is performing the roles in 
question well or badly. He then moves on to a discussion of intentions and 
their place in moral evaluation, and building on this he presents an argument 
that certain "moral absolutes" (especially, the prohibition against killing the 
innocent) can be justified on the basis of his theory. Next, he defends moral 
absolutes against some arguments of Scheffler, and he concludes with some 
reflections on moral dilemmas, which he thinks should be excluded from 
Christian ethics. Clearly there is a great deal of philosophical substance here; 
far too much, in fact, for a single essay. But the ideas richly deserve the 
further development they will no doubt receive. 
Merold Westphal concludes the book with "Taking st. Paul Seriously: Sin 
as an Epistemological Category." "Taking Paul seriously" means stressing 
the importance of the "noetic effects of sin," an important theme not only in 
Paul but in Augustine, Luther, Calvin, and Barth. The recognition of "moti-
vated irrationality" is also prominent in a number of philosophers, though 
most of them tend to exempt their own epistemological projects from the 
general indictment. Westphal recommends to Christian philosophers a wide-
ranging investigation which would pursue this topic throughout the history 
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of philosophy. His most pointed criticisms in the present essay, however, are 
directed at Reformed epistemologists Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas 
Wolterstorff, both of whom conspicuously fail to take st. Paul seriously.3 
Plantinga is faulted for, in effect, limiting the noetic effects of sin to unbe-
lievers; Wolterstorff, on the other hand, goes astray in holding, with Reid, 
that we have certain "innocent belief dispositions" whose outputs should 
normally be taken as trustworthy. In both of these philosophers, "creation 
does a full day's work, while the fall is only asked to put in a cameo appear-
ance" (p. 215); neither takes Paul seriously. 
What is noticeably lacking in this essay is any positive epistemological 
program-any means by which, amid the general ruin, we might manage to 
arrive at a few warranted beliefs. Westphal may be correct in thinking that 
Plantinga tends to limit the noetic effects of sin to unbelievers, though the 
passage he cites does not demonstrate this.4 And I do think Wolterstorff's 
epistemology is overly "Edenic," at least in the essay cited. But Westphal 
goes too far when he recommends "abandoning the idea that we naturally 
have innocent beliefs or belief dispositions and adopting the principle that 
our beliefs are guilty until proved innocent" (p. 217). As Westphal should 
know, it is simply impossible to "prove our beliefs innocent" in the way this 
would require; the outcome of the "guilty until proved innocent" principle 
must be a pervasive scepticism.s 
Or perhaps fideism. Westphal writes, paraphrasing Isaiah, "all our [noetic-
ally] righteous deeds are like a polluted garment," suggesting that he may 
agree with Bultmann that, also in epistemology, justification is by faith 
alone.6 But if this sort of all-out fide ism is the result of Westphal's program, 
we would be better off as epistemological Pelagians. It is possible, of course, 
that Westphal does not intend this result. But the result may be inevitable, 
whether intended or not. Once we employ the noetic effects of sin to launch 
a general assault on human cognition, three outcomes are possible: We will 
ourselves be buried in the general epistemological wreckage, we will (sin-
fully) exempt our own projects from the "principle of suspicion," or we will 
appeal to divine inspiration, in which case we are no longer engaged in doing 
philosophy. 7 
It is clear that the essays in Christian Philosophy, like those in the earlier 
Philosophy and the Christian Faith,S probe more deeply than is usual among 
philosophers into what has been regarded as the distinctive territory of Chris-
tian theology. The boundary between theology and philosophy may not be 
effaced entirely, but the Wall is down and traffic is moving freely back 
and forth. At the conference at which these papers were delivered, Ralph 
McInerny reflected on the oddity of theology done by philosophers and con-
cluded, "God has indeed from these stones raised up children to Abraham." 
May the stones speak on. 
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NOTES 
1. In a note (p. 86) Stump promises an essay which addresses "issues involving the 
mechanisms of God's providence." 
2. For a contrary view of the Lewis-Anscombe exchange, see Victor Reppert, "The 
Lewis-Anscombe Controversy: A Discussion of the Issues," Christian Scholar s Review 
XIX:I (September 1989), pp. 32-48. 
3. The essays cited are Plantinga's "Reason and Belief in God" and Wolterstorff's "Can 
Belief in God Be Rational If It Has No Foundations?"; both are contained in Faith and 
Rationality: Reason alld Belief in God, ed. Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff 
(Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1983). 
4. One might, more charitably, interpret Plantinga as holding that in the case of believers 
the noetic effects of sin, while present, are counteracted by divine grace sufficiently to 
permit our innate noetic dispositions to function more or less normally. 
5. Westphal does, it is true, allow for exceptions in the case of "existentially peripheral" 
beliefs such as those of mathematics. But it is hard to see how this can help; Westphal 
clearly rejects the foundationalist strategy of basing our metaphysical and religious beliefs 
on those other, less contaminated, areas of knowledge. 
6. "The man who wishes to believe in God as his God must realize that he has nothing 
in his hand on which to base his faith. He is suspended in mid-air, and cannot demand a 
proof of the Word which addresses him. For the ground and object of faith are identical. 
Security can be found only by abandoning aU security, by being ready, as Luther put it, 
to plunge into the inner darkness" ("Bultmann Replies To His Critics," in Kerygma and 
Myth, ed. Hans Werner Bartsch (New York: Harper and Row, 1961), p. 211). 
7. Westphal writes, "Perhaps the notion of Christian philosophy makes sense after all, 
not in terms of its propositional what but in terms of its prayerful how" (p. 220). A fine 
sentiment, but oddly placed at the end of ten pages spent criticizing his fellow Christian 
philosophers for accepting epistemological propositions which are not in accord with 
Christian doctrine. 
8. Thomas V. Morris, ed. (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988). 
Atheism: A Philosophical Justification, by Michael Martin. Philadelphia: 
Temple University Press, 1990. Pp. xiii and 533. 
JAMES A. KELLER, Wofford College. 
Michael Martin's purpose, as his subtitle suggests, is to present a comprehen-
sive philosophical justification for atheism. He realizes that this has been at-
tempted before, but he believes that the case for atheism must be restated in light 
of certain recent developments, including the appearance of some new arguments 
for theism and revised statements of old arguments, as well as new replies to 
arguments against the existence of God. Martin wants to respond to the most 
important of these. His book and all of the literature to which he refers are 
solidly within the analytic tradition of the philosophy of religion. 
